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FORMALIZING THE PLEA BARGAINING PROCESS AFTER LAFLER AND FRYE 
 
Sabrina Mirza* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Ninety-seven percent of federal criminal prosecutions and ninety-five percent of state 
criminal prosecutions do not go to trial; instead, they are resolved by way of guilty pleas.1 The 
centrality of plea bargaining in our contemporary criminal justice system, thus, cannot be 
denied.2 In recognition of this reality, the Supreme Court recently decided two cases on the same 
day: Lafler v. Cooper3 and Missouri v. Frye.4 By a 5-4 decision in both cases, the Supreme Court 
held that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel extends to negotiations 
made by defense counsel during the plea bargaining process.5 In so holding, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that plea bargaining is “not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the 
criminal justice system.”6 
More specifically, the Court held that a criminal defendant who decides to go to trial, 
rather than accept a favorable plea offer, is entitled to post-conviction relief if his or her refusal 
                                                          
*J.D. Candidate, 2015, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. in Philosophy and Middle Eastern Studies, 
Rutgers University, 2011. Special thanks to Professor Bernard Freamon for his thoughtful comments and 
suggestions, and the members of the Seton Hall Legislative Journal for their editorial assistance.  
1 Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, tbl. 
5.24.2010, http:// www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5242010.pdf; id. tbl. 5.46.2006, 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5462006.pdf. 
2 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970) (insisting that plea bargaining is “inherent in the criminal 
law and its administration” and that “[d]isposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of 
the [criminal] process but a highly desirable part for many reasons.”) (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 
257, 261 (1971)). 
3 132 S. Ct. 1376, at 1388 (2012) (commenting on the “the reality that criminal justice today is for the most part a 
system of pleas, not a system of trials.”). 
4 132 S. Ct. 1399, at 1407 (2012) (“In today’s criminal justice system, therefore, the negotiation of a plea bargain, 
rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a defendant.”).  
5 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to 
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”); Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 at 1407; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384 
(“Defendants have a Sixth Amendment Right to counsel, a right that extends to the plea-bargaining process.”). 
6 Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, at 1407 (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 
YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)) (emphasis in original). 
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or failure to accept the plea offer “was the result of ineffective assistance during the plea 
negotiation process.”7 Lafler and Frye address two different plea bargaining situations that might 
give rise to a post-conviction ineffective assistance of counsel claim: (1) if the defense counsel 
provides constitutionally deficient legal advice that leads the defendant to reject a plea offer, or 
(2) if the defense counsel neglects to inform the defendant of a plea offer, which then lapses.8 
Such claims are now to be evaluated under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington,9 
which requires the defendant to show first that their defense counsel made errors falling below 
the constitutional standard and second, that those errors prejudiced the defendant’s case so as to 
deprive him or her of a fair result.10  
Recognition of a right to effective assistance during plea bargaining, in a system that 
relies heavily on plea offers, is a victory in its own right, despite its belated timing.11 The reach 
of the Court’s recognition of this right, however, is not entirely clear.12 In order to better 
understand this lack of clarity, it is helpful to first understand how plea bargaining works. In 
general, plea bargaining is a “negotiated agreement” by which a defendant agrees to plead guilty 
in exchange for the prosecutor’s offer of a more lenient sentence or dismissal of other charges.13 
It is a process dictated by personal style, rather than any hard-and-fast rules.14 Moreover, it is a 
process that takes place largely “off the record.”15  This makes the vast majority of plea offers 
                                                          
7 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1386. 
8 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383; Frye, 132 S.Ct. at 1404. 
9 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  
10 Id. at 687. 
11 See Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, 126 HARV. L. REV. 150 at 151 
(2012) (“The Court, like Rip Van Winkle, has at last awoken from its long slumber and sees the vast field it has left 
all but unregulated.”). 
12 See Part II (discussing cases both denying and accepting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel where 
defendant did not receive a “formal” plea offer). 
13 See infra note 97 (defining “plea bargaining”). 
14 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (citing Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, at 741 (2011)). 
15 Bibas, supra note 11, at 150. 
3 
 
“informal,” with the exception of plea offers that are required by some states to be in writing, 
which make the plea offer “formal” by creating a record of it.16  
The reach of the Court’s holding is uncertain because it uses the words “formal offer” 
sporadically in Frye, including in the holding, and not at all in Lafler.17 Consequently, it is 
unclear, under Lafler and Frye, whether an informal plea offer can form the basis of an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim or whether, in order to assert a claim, the defendant must 
have received a written plea offer, one thereby “formally” offered by the prosecution.18 This 
confusion presents an important issue because most states do not require a plea offer to be in 
writing.19 Where there is no record of ongoing plea discussions, the defendant is faced with the 
difficult, if not impossible, task of proving the prejudice prong of Strickland if he or she receives 
constitutionally deficient advice – that is, but for his or her defense counsel’s ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the defendant would have accepted a guilty plea.20  
This Note will argue that it is still difficult for a defendant to succeed on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, following a refusal to accept a plea offer, due to: 1) the lack of 
clarity on the reach of the holdings in Lafler and Frye, and 2) the lack of formal requirements 
during the plea bargaining process. As discussed, the prejudice prong of Strickland requires the 
defendant to show that he or she would not have accepted the plea offer absent defense counsel’s 
                                                          
16 See infra note 128 for a survey of states that require plea offers to be in writing and states that do not. 
17 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408-10 (using the words “formal offer” six different times); Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (never 
using the words “formal offer”).  
18 See infra Part II (discussing cases both denying and accepting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel where 
defendant did not receive a “formal” plea offer). 
19 See infra note 128..  
20 Bibas, supra note 11, at 162 (“Few defendants have documentary or other evidence that their attorneys did not tell 
them of a plea offer or gave them incorrect advice. Given the difficulty of proving such claims and satisfying both of 
Strickland’s prongs, few Strickland claims of any sort succeed, let alone fabricated ones.”); see also Jenny Roberts, 
Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650 at 2671 (2013) (describing how “obstacles have made relief 
from ineffective assistance generally inaccessible to individual litigants, and Strickland its progeny are deserving of 
the well-developed body of scholarly critique about the hurdles the doctrine has constructed.”) 
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erroneous legal advice.21 Lower courts disagree about whether the holdings in Lafler and Frye 
should be limited to “formal” plea offers or extend to all plea offers.22 This Note argues that it 
makes better sense, constitutionally, to extend the Lafler and Frye holdings to all plea offers.23 
Such an interpretation recognizes the reality that extensive negotiations often occur between 
defense counsel and the prosecution, usually without the defendant present, before any plea offer 
is committed to writing.24 Moreover, this approach does not penalize the defendant for relying on 
a plea offer that the prosecution and the defense counsel failed to put into writing.  
The second requirement under the prejudice prong of Strickland, as applied in Lafler and 
Frye, requires the defendant to show that if he or she had accepted the plea offer, there is a 
reasonable probability that the prosecution and the court would have accepted the offer to plead 
guilty.25 The prosecution and the courts, however, generally have broad unregulated discretion to 
reject a plea bargain after the defendant accepts it, and there is no clear standard establishing 
what the practice of courts and prosecutors is in such circumstances.26 This means that, 
regardless of whether the defendant would have accepted the plea offer, the defendant’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim could easily be denied on the sometimes baseless ground 
that the plea offer would not have been accepted by the lower court or the prosecution.27 In order 
to safeguard the right afforded to defendants under Lafler and Frye, the plea bargaining process 
                                                          
21 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
22 See infra Part II (discussing cases both denying and accepting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel where 
defendant did not receive a “formal” plea offer).  
23 See Roberts, supra note 20 at 2672 (discussing the Court’s intent in Frye when using “formal” plea offer 
language).  
24 Id. at 2671 (“A more powerful critique of regulating the plea bargaining process is that because bargaining 
happens off the record between prosecution and defense – and normally outside the defendant’s presence – it is 
difficult to adequately examine any later claim of ineffectiveness in that process.”). 
25 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409 (“Defendants must also demonstrate a reasonable probability the plea would have been 
entered without the prosecution canceling it or the trial court refusing to accept it, if they had the authority to 
exercise that discretion under state law.”). 
26 See Bibas, supra note 11, at 162. 
27 Id. 
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should be formalized by requiring written plea offers and standardized procedures that guide 
how the prosecution and courts may reject plea offers.  
Part I of this Note provides background on the Supreme Court’s development of a 
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims during the plea bargaining process, and how 
that standard has changed after the most recent decisions of Lafler and Frye. Part II shows that 
there is now confusion in the lower courts as to whether the holdings in Lafler and Frye apply to 
all plea offers, or only to those plea offers that are considered “formal.” Part II further analyzes 
the plea bargaining process and why informality in the process places defendants at a distinct 
disadvantage when bringing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Part III examines the 
statutes and court rules of the states, as well as the ABA Criminal Justice Standards, the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, in order to 
determine where formal processes may already be in play and where they ought to be. Finally, 
Part IV balances the policy implications for the duties of defense counsel and the prosecution 
that would be affected by carrying out the recommended formalization of the plea bargaining 
process outlined in Part III. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. The Standard under Hill v. Lockhart and Padilla v. Kentucky  
 
Prior to Lafler and Frye, the Supreme Court addressed the right to effective assistance of 
counsel during the plea bargaining process in two decisions: Hill v. Lockhart28 and Padilla v. 
Kentucky.29 In Hill, the Court held that the correct standard for courts to apply in assessing 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the plea bargaining context is the two-prong test set 
                                                          
28 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
29 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
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forth in Strickland.30 Before Hill, the Court focused instead on whether the defense counsel’s 
advice caused the defendant to enter a plea involuntarily or unintelligently.31 Now, under the 
Strickland standard, in order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
defendant must satisfy two prongs: 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable.32 
 
Hill involved a petitioner who pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and theft of 
property.33 He later brought a habeas petition based on ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging 
that his counsel failed to advise him about his parole eligibility date – specifically that he would 
have to serve half of his sentence before he was eligible for parole.34 The Court held that 
Petitioner did not satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland because he failed to allege in his 
petition that, had his counsel correctly advised him, he would have gone to trial instead of 
accepting the guilty plea.”35 The holding in Hill was limited.  The Court stated: “[w]e find it 
unnecessary to determine whether there may be circumstances under which erroneous advice by 
counsel as to parole eligibility may be deemed constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, 
because in the present case we conclude that petitioner's allegations are insufficient to satisfy the 
Strickland v. Washington requirement of ‘prejudice.’”36 Thus, Hill left open the question of 
                                                          
30 Hill, 474 U.S. at 58. 
31 See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Brady, 397 U.S. 742. 
32 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  
33 Hill, 474 U.S. at 53. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 59-60. 
36 Id. at 60. 
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whether the defense counsel is under a constitutional duty to negotiate effectively during the plea 
bargaining process.37 
In Padilla, the defense counsel had misinformed the defendant about the consequences of 
pleading guilty, advising him that it would not result in deportation. This advice was plainly 
wrong and defendant faced deportation as a result of his guilty plea.38 While the Court in Hill 
was reluctant to determine whether erroneous advice as to parole eligibility could constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel in other cases, the Court in Padilla found that, “advice 
regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel.”39 Padilla was concerned with only the first prong of Strickland – whether defense 
counsel’s erroneous advice regarding the guilty plea amounted to performance falling below the 
reasonableness standard of effective assistance of counsel – and held that the advice did fall 
below the reasonableness standard.40 Despite the fact that the Court did not reach the prejudice 
issue, the Padilla majority used strong language favoring a broadening of the scope of the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.41 In focusing its discussion on the 
consequences of bad advice for defendants, the Court emphasized that, “we have long 
recognized that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of 
the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.”42 
Although Padilla expanded defense counsel duties after Hill, the standard for ineffective 
assistance of counsel still did not require the defense counsel to obtain a favorable deal for the 
defendant. Padilla and Hill dealt specifically with the situation in which a defendant accepts a 
                                                          
37 Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Indirect Potential of Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ L. REV. 633, at 634 (2013). 
38 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. 
39 Id. at 1476. 
40 Id. at 1482. 
41 Id. at 1486 (“It is our responsibility under the Constitution to ensure that no criminal defendant—whether a citizen 
or not—is left to the ‘mercies of incompetent counsel.’”) (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759).  
42 Id. at 1481. 
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guilty plea and foregoes trial.43 Lafler and Frye differ significantly from the facts of Padilla and 
Hill in that they involve defendants who reject plea offers and go to trial, alleging that they 
would not have rejected the plea offer if they were correctly informed by their counsel.44 The 
new question facing the Supreme Court in Lafler and Frye was whether a defendant could assert 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim if he received a fair trial. Not only did the Court in 
Lafler and Frye hold that a defendant could bring such a claim, but it also required defense 
counsel to satisfy the Sixth Amendment by negotiating effectively during the plea bargaining 
process.45 Now, errors in the negotiation process may satisfy the prejudice prong under 
Strickland and thereby constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.46 
B. Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye 
 
i. The Facts 
 
In Lafler, Anthony Cooper pointed a gun at Kali Mundy’s head, fired a shot, and 
missed.47 Mundy fled, and Cooper followed, firing additional shots.48 Mundy survived, with 
gunshot wounds in her buttocks, hip, and abdomen.49 Cooper was charged with assault with 
intent to murder, possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony, misdemeanor possession 
of marijuana, and for being a habitual offender.50 The prosecution offered, twice, that in 
exchange for a guilty plea, it would dismiss two of the charges and recommend a sentence of 51 
to 85 months on the remaining charges.51 Cooper rejected these offers, allegedly because his 
defense counsel “convinced him that the prosecution would be unable to establish his intent to 
                                                          
43 Hill, 474 U.S. at 368; Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. 
44 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1406 (distinguishing the legal issue in Hill and Padilla from the one presented in Frye). 
45 See Oliver supra note 37, at 633 (“The Supreme Court's two previous forays into this area recognized the right to 
the effective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining but did not recognize the right to an effective negotiator.”). 
46 Id.  
47 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383.  
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
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murder Mundy because she was shot below the waist.”52 Cooper was offered a less favorable 
plea at trial, which he rejected, and was subsequently convicted on all counts, receiving a 
mandatory minimum jail sentence of 185 to 360 months.53 Cooper appealed, claiming ineffective 
assistance of counsel, and the state court of appeals rejected his claim.54 Thereafter, the United 
States District Court granted Cooper’s petition for habeas relief, and ordered specific 
performance of the original plea offer.55  The Sixth Circuit affirmed, essentially because Cooper 
received a higher sentence due to his counsel’s ineffective assistance.56 
In Frye, Galin Frye was charged with driving with a revoked driver’s license.57 This was 
his fourth offense, after three previous convictions, so it was considered a felony punishable by 
up to four years imprisonment.58 Frye’s defense counsel was presented with two offers from the 
prosecutor in exchange for the defendant’s guilty plea: the first offer was for the defendant to 
agree to a 3-year sentence with a recommendation of ten days in jail, and the second offer was 
that the charge be reduced to a misdemeanor, with a recommendation of a ninety-day sentence.59 
Both offers expired without the defense counsel ever advising Frye of their existence.60 Frye was 
sentenced to three years in jail after pleading guilty on the eve of trial.61 Frye then sought state 
post-conviction relief, alleging that his counsel denied him effective assistance of counsel by 
failing to inform him of the prosecutor’s plea offer.62 Although the trial court denied his motion, 
the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Frye satisfied the requirements for an 
                                                          
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 1384.  
56 Id. 
57 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404. 
58 Id.  
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 1404-05.  
62 Id. at 1405. 
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ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland, and remanded the case to the trial court 
to either re-try the case or allow Frye to re-plead to the offer.63 
ii. The Majority and Dissenting Opinions 
 
Lafler and Frye were argued and decided together. Ultimately, the Supreme Court in 
Frye held that, “[t]he Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel extends to the 
consideration of plea offers that lapse or are rejected.”64 Moreover, the majority in Lafler 
similarly applied the Sixth Amendment right to the plea bargaining process and held that the 
court’s remedy granted to the defendant who successfully makes out a Strickland violation must 
“neutralize the taint” of the constitutional violation, as long as it does not amount to a “windfall” 
or “needlessly squander” state resources.65 In reaching this conclusion, the majority in Lafler 
disagreed with the government’s argument that “[a] fair trial wipes clean any deficient 
performance by defense counsel during plea bargaining” because that argument “ignores the 
reality that criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”66 
It is for this reason that the majorities’ opinions in Lafler and Frye are centered on the notion that 
defendants are entitled to correct advice on the impact of proposed plea agreements, even though 
there is neither a constitutional right to receive a plea offer nor a right to have a judge accept the 
plea offer.67  
Justice Scalia, in his dissents in Lafler and Frye, refused to recognize that constitutional 
rights should attach to the plea bargaining process. In focusing most of his opinion on how plea 
bargaining is an embarrassing part of the criminal justice system, Justice Scalia, in many 
                                                          
63 Id. at 1405.  
64 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1402. 
65 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1381 (citations omitted).  
66 Id. at 1388.  
67 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1410 (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 at 561) (finding no Constitutional right to be 
offered a plea); (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 247 at 262) (finding no federal right for a judge to accept a 
plea).  
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respects, does not respond to the arguments made in the majoritys’ opinions.68 His argument 
about how the system ought to be ignores the reality that guilty plea dispositions in actuality 
command the vast majority of state and federal criminal convictions.69 Justice Scalia’s response 
to this reality, much like the argument made by the government, is that no injustice has been 
committed against the defendant who received the “exorbitant gold standard of American justice 
– a full-dress criminal trial.”70 Where plea bargaining commands the criminal justice system, 
however, a “full-dress criminal trial” cannot be relied upon alone to protect the constitutional 
rights of defendants.   
While Justice Scalia may have missed the mark with his discussion on plea bargaining in 
the criminal justice system, in other parts of his opinion, he sheds light on important questions 
the majority opinion failed to address.71 In particular, Frye provides that in circumstances where 
defense counsel causes a plea offer to lapse or to be rejected, defendants must show, under the 
prejudice prong of Strickland, a reasonable probability that: (1) they would have accepted the 
plea offer absent ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the prosecution would not have rejected 
the plea offer later if they had discretion to reject it under state law; (3) the trial court would not 
have refused to accept the plea offer if it had discretion to reject it under state law.72 The 
majority opinion essentially avoids the issue of how the defendant would be able to satisfy the 
second and third requirements under Frye, asserting: 
It can be assumed that in most jurisdictions prosecutors and judges 
are familiar with the boundaries of acceptable plea bargains and 
sentences. So in most instances it should not be difficult to make 
                                                          
68 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1397 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today . . .  the Supreme Court of the United States elevates 
plea bargaining from a necessary evil to a constitutional entitlement. It is no longer a somewhat embarrassing 
adjunct to our criminal justice system.”).   
69 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 1.  
70 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1397-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[t]he Court today opens a whole new field of 
constitutionalized criminal procedure: plea-bargaining law.”). 
71 Id. at 1391.  
72 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409.  
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an objective assessment as to whether or not a particular fact or 
intervening circumstance would suffice, in the normal course, to 
cause prosecutorial withdrawal or judicial nonapproval of a plea 
bargain.73 
 
In this attempt to address how the defendant must prove two out of the three requirements under 
Frye, the majority simply makes an assumption - “it should not be difficult to make an objective 
assessment” regarding the ordinary practices of prosecution and courts when rejecting plea offers 
– and it does not explain where that assumption is coming from. Justice Scalia retorts: 
“[a]ssuredly it can [be assumed], just as it can be assumed that the sun rises in the west; but I 
know of no basis for the assumption.”74 The majority’s statement is less than satisfactory for 
Justice Scalia, and more so for defendants, who are likely to encounter difficulties trying to 
prove that prosecutors and courts would have accepted the plea offer, in the absence of any 
standards articulating their practices.75 Justice Scalia raises questions that demonstrate some of 
these difficulties:  
Is it constitutional, for example, for the prosecution to withdraw a 
plea offer that has already been accepted? Or to withdraw an offer 
before the defense has had adequate time to consider and accept it? 
Or to make no plea offer at all, even though its case is weak-
thereby excluding the defendant from ‘the criminal justice 
system’?76 
 
These questions indicate the need for procedural guidelines governing how the prosecution and 
the court may reject plea offers in order for defendants to be able to prove the second prong of 
Strickland.   
While codified standards were not specifically referenced as guides for meeting the 
second (prejudice) prong of Strickland, under the first prong of Strickland, courts are required to 
                                                          
73 Id. at 1410.  
74 Id. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
75 See, e.g., Bibas supra note 11 at 162 (“[d]efendants will find it hard to prove that prosecutors would have left plea 
offers on the table and that judges would have accepted proposed bargains, and thus that defendants would 
ultimately have benefited from the proposed bargains.”).  
76 Id. at 1392.  
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look to professional norms of attorney conduct to determine whether defense counsel’s 
performance was ineffective.77 The majority decision in Frye extends the Strickland idea to 
defense counsel’s performance during plea bargain negotiations, stating, “[t]hough the standard 
for counsel’s performance is not determined solely by reference to codified standards of 
professional practice, these standards can be important guides.”78 Specifically, the majority cited 
ABA standards and state bar professional standards, as well as state rules and state and federal 
case law to define the duties of defense counsel under the Sixth Amendment.79 Such standards 
help defendants prove the first prong of Strickland, and guide judges in their determination of 
whether the first prong has been met; similar standards codifying how the prosecution and courts 
may reject plea offers would also help defendants prove the second prong of Strickland, as well 
as help judges reach a fair result on such claims.80  
II. FORMAL VS. INFORMAL PLEA OFFERS 
 
A.  Confusion over whether “Formal Offer” is required to Show Prejudice   
 
An important part of the holding in Frye states, “[d]efense counsel has the duty to 
communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that 
may be favorable to the accused.”81 Justice Kennedy clarified the meaning of “formal offer” as 
used in Frye, stating, “the fact of a formal offer means that its terms and its processing can be 
documented so that what took place in the negotiation process becomes more clear if some later 
inquiry turns on the conduct of earlier pretrial negotiations.”82 As previously noted, the Supreme 
                                                          
77 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.  
78 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (emphases added). 
79 Id., 1408-09.  
80 See Part III (examining codified requirements of plea bargaining). 
81 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (emphasis added). 
82 Frye 132 S. Ct. at 1409. 
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Court uses the word “formal” in Frye, but not in Lafler.83 This inconsistent use of the “formal 
offer” language between the decisions of Lafler and Frye suggests that the Court did not intend 
to limit its holdings to formal offers.84 
In recent cases, however, courts have denied claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
for the reason that no “formal offer” was extended to the defendant. One court even cites Lafler 
as authority for requiring the defendant to be offered a “formal” plea offer, despite the Lafler 
opinion not containing any “formal offer” language.85 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals adds 
to the confusion in its opinion, Kingsberry v. United States,86 decided prior to Lafler and Frye, 
holding that a formal offer is required to show prejudice for a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. The Kingsberry court stated:  
We address the prejudice component, assuming arguendo that the 
performance of Kingsberry's trial counsel fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. We begin by noting that prejudice is 
possible, notwithstanding a subsequent fair trial, where counsel 
failed to provide accurate advice regarding a plea agreement offer. 
Logic dictates therefore, that to establish such prejudice, the 
petitioner must begin by proving that a plea agreement was 
formally offered by the government. Kingsberry argues that the 
contradictory affidavits submitted on this issue create a fact 
dispute, mandating an evidentiary hearing. We disagree. 
 
The record before this Court is sufficient to show conclusively that 
a formal plea offer never materialized. The two parties necessarily 
privy to a plea offer and fundamental to resolution of this issue 
both deny the existence of a plea agreement offer . . . . No facts 
casting genuine doubt upon the veracity of [trial counsel's] 
affidavit were presented.87 
                                                          
83 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408-10 (using the words “formal offer” six different times); Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (never 
using the words “formal offer”). 
84 See Roberts, supra note 20 at 2662 (“Surely, if the Court meant to limit the right to effective assistance to 
informing and counseling defendants about formal plea offers the prosecution has extended, it would not have 
repeatedly used the words “plea bargaining,” “plea negotiations,” and “negotiation of a plea bargain.”). 
85 See DeFilippo v. United States, 09-CV-4153 NGG, 2013 WL 817196, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2013) (“Thus, the 
lack of a formal plea offer strongly weighs against a finding that DeFilippo would have pled guilty. See Lafler 132 
S. Ct. at 1385.”) (quoting Judge Garaufis). 
86 202 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2000). 
87 Id. at 1032-33 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted; citations omitted). 
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The Northern District of Iowa interpreted Kingsberry, in Johnson v. United States,88 as 
“establish[ing] the requirement of a formal plea offer from the prosecution to be a bright line test 
of prejudice arising from counsel's deficient performance in plea negotiations.”89 On the basis of 
this interpretation, the Johnson court rejected the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel because he was not extended a formal offer.90 The Johnson court cited the Sixth 
Amendment as authority for denying the defendant’s claim based on there being no formal offer 
presented to the defendant.91 
By contrast, in another Northern District of Iowa case, Wanatee v. Ault,92 the court found 
that the defendant was offered a formal plea as required under Kingsberry even though the offer 
was not in writing.93 The court arrived at this conclusion by distinguishing the facts of Wanatee 
from those in Kingsberry. In Kingsberry, the defendant initiated plea negotiations by proffering 
information, after which the government did not make a plea offer because it found the proffer to 
be inadequate, while in Wanatee, the defendant proffered information only after the prosecution 
extended a plea offer.94 This distinction confuses the issue of what constitutes a “formal offer” 
because it is not based on whether or not the offer was in writing. 
                                                          
88 860 F. Supp. 2d 663 (N.D. Iowa 2012). 
89 Id. at 789. 
90 Id. at 790 (“Where no formal offer of a plea agreement from the prosecution ever materialized, Johnson cannot 
make the bright line showing necessary to prove prejudice in plea negotiations.”) (citing Kingsberry, 202 F.3d at 
1032).  
91 Johnson v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 2d 663 at 788 (N.D. Iowa 2012) (“Trial counsel's deficient performance in 
continuing to push in capital murder prosecution for an agreement to sentence for term of years, once plea to term of 
years became both wholly unrealistic and wholly unreasonable as bargaining position did not prejudice defendant, 
and thus did not constitute ineffective assistance, as prosecution never formally offered defendant a plea agreement 
to a sentence less than death. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6”).  
92 101 F. Supp. 2d 1189, at 1202 (N.D. Iowa 2000) aff'd, 259 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2001). 
93 Id. at 1202-03 (“It is undisputed that there was no written offer of a plea agreement and that no written plea 
agreement was ever prepared or executed.”); (“the initial requirement of Kingsberry, “that to establish . . . prejudice, 
the petitioner must begin by proving that a plea agreement was formally offered by the government,” Kingsberry, 
202 F.3d at 1032, has been satisfied in Wanatee's case.”).  
94 Id. at 1203. 
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Some recent cases rely on a combination of Lafler, Frye, and Kingsberry to dismiss 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for lack of prejudice when no formal plea offer was 
extended.95 On the other hand, other courts have explicitly found that, “[t]he absence of a formal 
plea offer does not necessarily mean there were no plea negotiations.”96 Thus, the need to clarify 
the “formal offer” distinction used in Frye is evident.  
B. The Plea Bargaining Process  
 
 In order to better understand the distinction between formal and informal plea offers, as 
well as the rules and statutes governing plea bargaining, a more basic question is worth 
exploring: what exactly is the plea bargaining process and how does it work? To begin, Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines a “plea bargain” as, “[a] negotiated agreement between a prosecutor and 
a criminal defendant whereby the defendant pleads guilty to a lesser offense or to one of multiple 
charges in exchange for some concession by the prosecutor, usually a more lenient sentence or a 
dismissal of the other charges.”97 
 This definition, characterizing a plea bargain as a “negotiated agreement,” describes plea 
bargaining as a type of negotiation. Courts look to negotiation texts for guidance in evaluating 
whether defense counsel is negotiating effectively during the plea bargaining process, 
                                                          
95 See Williams v. United States, 2:08-CR-00112-GZS-2, 2013 WL 2155390, at *4 (D. Me. May 17, 2013) (“When 
there is no formal offer on the table, this particular duty [for defense counsel to communicate formal offers, under 
Frye] does not arise.”); Gilchrist v. United States, CIV. DKC 08-1218, 2012 WL 4520469, at *19 (D. Md. Sept. 27, 
2012) (“Petitioner clearly cannot establish the deficient performance prong under Strickland without showing that a 
formal plea offer was made.”); Ramos v. United States, CR 01-10369-PBS, 2012 WL 1109081, at *5 (D. Mass. 
Mar. 30, 2012) (“If no plea offer is made, the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining would 
typically not be cognizable . . . .[here] [t]here is no evidence that Ramos instructed his lawyer to negotiate a plea 
prior to trial, or that the government made an offer to negotiate, which he rebuffed.”); Silva v. United States, 4:12-
CV-0898-DGK, 2013 WL 1628444, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 16, 2013) (“the movant must prove that the alleged plea 
agreement was formally offered by the Government . . . . [i]n the present case, Silva has failed to demonstrate that 
the Government ever offered a binding plea agreement for 63 to 78 months imprisonment”); Ortiz v. United States, 
CIV 12-4092, 2013 WL 1339722, at *8 (D.S.D. Feb. 7, 2013) (citations omitted) (“Ortiz has failed to prove a plea 
agreement was formally offered. Ortiz does not claim a plea offer was made, and the Government and Ortiz's 
counsel have explicitly denied a plea offer was made.”).  
96 Atkinson v. Elwood, CIV.A.01-CIV-5462, 2004 WL 2943665, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2004) (citations omitted). 
97 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1270 (9th ed. 2009). 
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“stress[ing] preparation as a required component of good negotiation.”98 Also in line with the 
definition, courts and legal scholars have viewed the plea bargaining process as governed by 
contract principles.99 Yet, if contract principles are being applied to plea bargaining, then why 
are there no uniform rules as to when offers must be in writing and whether or not the 
prosecution has discretion to reject a plea offer once it has been accepted?100  
These questions have become important with respect to ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims after Lafler and Frye because defendants must demonstrate a reasonable probability that 
the defendant would have accepted the plea and that the prosecution and court would not have 
rejected it once it was accepted.101 For example, the Seventh Circuit held that the defendant’s 
self-serving statement alone was insufficient to establish a reasonable probability that the 
defendant would have accepted the plea offer absent the defense counsel’s ineffective assistance; 
“objective evidence” was required to corroborate the defendant’s self-serving statement.102 The 
Eleventh Circuit similarly required the defendant to produce objective evidence corroborating his 
claim that he wanted to accept a plea offer, but was advised by the defense counsel to reject it.103 
The problem with requiring the defendant to present “objective evidence” to corroborate an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is that the plea bargaining system is often so informal that 
it does not require defense counsel or prosecuting attorneys to create any evidence whatsoever 
that would make it possible for the defendant to bring such a claim.  
                                                          
98 Rishi Batra, Lafler and Frye: A New Constitutional Standard for Negotiation, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 
309, 325 (2013) (citations omitted). 
99 Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to “Guilty”: Plea-bargaining as Negotiation, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 
119 (1997); see also Frank Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983) 
(characterizing the plea agreement as a bargained-for transaction); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 6, at 1910 (“The 
courts, on the other hand, have proceeded to construct a body of contract-based law to regulate the plea bargaining 
process, taking for granted the efficiency and decency of the process being regulated.”). 
100 See discussion infra, Part IV. 
101 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409. 
102 See Toro v. Fairman, 940 F.2d 1065, at 1068 (7th Cir.1991). 
103 Diaz v. United States, 930 F.2d 832, at 835 (11th Cir.1991). 
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 The main reason plea bargaining is informal and largely unregulated, as the Court in Frye 
recognized, is because plea bargaining is, “by its nature, defined to a substantial degree by 
personal style.”104 For this reason, the Court hesitated to impinge upon defense counsels’ broad 
leeway to decide how they wish to negotiate offers with the prosecuting attorneys.105 As a result, 
the Court provided little guidance on the duties of defense counsel, setting forth only the bare 
minimum for defense counsel to communicate “formal offers” to the defendant.106  
This is not to say that there is no process at all governing plea bargaining. In fact, much 
has been written on effective negotiating strategies.107 Post-Padilla, the American Bar 
Association provided guidance to defense counsel and prosecutors on their duties to inform 
defendants of immigration and other consequences of accepting or rejecting a guilty plea.108 Still, 
the extent to which the right to effective assistance of counsel regulates plea bargaining is 
uncertain.109 Other guidelines include The National Legal Aid and Defender Association’s 
Performance Guidelines for Criminal Defense Representation, which requires counsel to be 
“completely familiar” with “concessions that the client might offer” and “benefits the client 
might obtain.”110 In addition, “[c]ounsel should attempt to become familiar with the practices 
and policies of a particular jurisdiction, judge and prosecuting authority which may affect the 
                                                          
104 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (citing Premo, 131 S. Ct. at 741); see also, G. Nicholas Herman, Plea-bargaining § 1.02 
(2d ed. 1981) (discussing different plea-bargaining styles). 
105 Id. (“This case presents neither the necessity nor the occasion to define the duties of defense counsel in those 
respects, however.”). 
106 Id.  
107 See, e.g., Dann Orr & Chris Guthrie, Anchoring, Information, Expertise, and Negotiation: New Insights from 
Meta-Analysis, 21 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RES. 597 (2006); Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective 
Negotiatior: A Systemic Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73 (1995). 
108 Mark Walsh, Weighing the Consequences: Task Force Probes Defense Lawyers’ Role After Padilla, A.B.A. J., 
APR. 2011, at 60-61, available at 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/task_force_probes_defense_lawyers_role_after_padilla/.  
109 See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Lafler, Frye, and the Subtle Art of Winning by Losing, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 41 (2012) (“It 
remains to be seen whether the Court in Lafler similarly has obliged a defense attorney to push (and how hard?) a 
defendant to accept a plea bargain (or, for that matter, to push a prosecutor to offer one).”).  
110 Guideline 6.2: The Contents of the Negotiations, THE NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION’S 
PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, available at 
http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Standards/Performance_Guidelines#sixone. 
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content and likely results of negotiated plea bargains.”111 The existence of such guides 
demonstrates that defining effective plea bargaining “is neither unrealistic nor impossible to 
achieve.”112 
Strategies used by the prosecution and defense to negotiate plea bargains vary widely. 
This again makes regulation of the process more difficult. Several factors are taken into account 
to determine whether a plea agreement should be reached, and if so, what the plea agreement 
should entail.113 The factors both parties evaluate include determining the strength of each side’s 
case, how the jury is likely to lean in a given location, how evidentiary issues in the case are 
governed by legal rules, and what the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (“BATNA”) is 
available to each side.114 For defense counsel, such evaluation is a matter of becoming familiar 
with “the prosecutor’s personality” and how “the judge’s reactions to specific types of crimes” 
will affect the outcome of the case at hand.115 For the prosecution, evaluation comes down to 
whether the evidence is strong enough against the defendant to render the case worthwhile to 
take to trial.116  
The literature describing plea bargaining strategies makes clear that plea bargaining is by 
and large a process dictated by experience rather than hard-and-fast rules. As Professors Scott 
and Stuntz note: 
The problem is that one cannot distinguish between good and bad 
bargaining by looking at the process by which the lawyers reached 
their deal. A two-minute conversation with the prosecutor in the 
hallway with only slight advance preparation may represent 
evidence of sloppiness and sloth. Or it may be that defense 
counsel, who has a great deal of experience in dealing with similar 
                                                          
111 Id. See also, Anthony Amsterdam, 1 TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES §§201-19 (5th ed. 
1988). 
112 Roberts, supra note 20, at 2666.  
113 See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 69, at 121.  
114 See id. 
115 See id. 
116 See id., at 124. 
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cases, knows the market price, realizes that investigation is 
extremely unlikely to lead anywhere, and understands how to get 
to the best offer expeditiously. In a context where bargaining skill 
depends more on knowledge of information about other cases than 
on case-specific preparation, it is hard to judge a defense attorney's 
performance by his behavior in any one case.117 
 
Thus, evaluation of the performance of counsel during plea bargaining is difficult because less 
effort expended by counsel might be indicative of more experience, rather than laziness. Lafler 
and Frye have the potential to encourage more discussion of plea bargaining strategies where it 
was previously considered taboo.118 Mere discussion, however, is unlikely to bring about the 
change needed in order for defendants to succeed on ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
during the plea bargaining process. 
III. SURVEY OF STATE AND FEDERAL RULES AND STATUTES  
 
A. Standards of Professionally Competent Assistance 
 
Supreme Court cases applying the Strickland standard have looked to the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct to determine competency under the first prong.119 While the Rules do not 
explicitly address plea bargaining, the Rules apply to lawyers in their capacities as negotiators.120 
Formalization of plea offers, discussed in Part B of this section, would facilitate enforcement of 
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Rule 1.6, by ensuring that 
defendants are not denied access to evidence of plea negotiations by defense counsel who invoke 
the attorney-client privilege and duty of confidentiality.121 
                                                          
117 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 6, at 1959. 
118 See Oliver, supra note 37, 637-640. 
119 See e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003). 
120 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, PREAMBLE 2 (2012). 
121 Laurence A. Benner, Expanding the Right to Effective Counsel at Plea Bargaining Opening Pandora's Box?, 
CRIM. JUST., Fall 2012, at 4, 7(citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.6(a)-(b)(5))  
21 
 
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice directly address plea bargaining duties of 
defense counsel when negotiating with the prosecution.122 Standard 4-4.1(a) provides: 
Defense counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of the 
circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts 
relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of 
conviction. The investigation should include efforts to secure 
information in the possession of the prosecution and law 
enforcement authorities. The duty to investigate exists regardless 
of the accused's admissions or statements to defense counsel of 
facts constituting guilt or the accused's stated desire to plead 
guilty.123 
 
The Supreme Court cited to this standard to establish the incompetency of defense counsel in 
Rompilla v. Beard.124 The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Pleas of Guilty discusses the 
responsibilities of defense counsel in more detail.125 Standard 14-3.2(b) states that “[d]efense 
counsel should not recommend to a defendant acceptance of a plea unless appropriate 
investigation and study of the case has been completed.” This standard was fashioned 
following Hill and it has not been updated to reflect the Court’s holdings in Lafler and 
Frye.126 
B. Written Requirement for Plea Offers 
 
In Frye, the Court suggested that in order to prevent “late, frivolous, or fabricated claims 
after a later, less advantageous plea offer has been accepted or after a trial leading to conviction 
with resulting harsh consequences,” states may require that “all offers must be in writing.”127 The 
Court then cited the New Jersey Court Rule requiring that “any plea offer” from the prosecution 
                                                          
122 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3D. 1993), 4-
6.2. 
123 Id. at 4-4.1(a). 
124 545 U.S. 374 (2005). 
125 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLEAS OF GUILTY, 14-3.2. 
126 Batra, supra note 98 at 321-22. 
127 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408-09.  
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to the defense be in writing.128 Only a small minority of states, however, currently requires plea 
agreements to be in writing and signed by both parties.129 Other states have not stated a writing 
requirement, but have encouraged such a requirement in their case law.130 In Alabama, for 
example, no writing requirement is codified in the state statutes or court rules, but in Ex parte 
Cassady, the Supreme Court stated: 
The problem involved here could have been easily avoided had the 
plea agreement been written and all the terms and conditions made 
a part of the writing. If parties would reduce their plea agreements 
to writing, and present them to the trial court prior to sentencing, 
rather than afterward, as was done here, resolution of cases 
questioning the existence or contents of plea agreements would be 
greatly facilitated. The record would also show whether or not the 
trial court had accepted the plea agreement.131 
 
Thus, the Alabama Supreme Court makes clear that written plea agreements would greatly 
facilitate the resolution of cases where “the existence or contents of plea agreements” is at issue. 
 Formalization in the form of a written requirement would further allow courts to perform 
their duty to ensure that plea agreements have a factual basis. For example, Oregon stipulates 
that “[t]he court shall determine whether the plea is the result of prior plea discussions and a plea 
agreement. If the plea is the result of a plea agreement, the court shall determine the nature of the 
agreement.”132 It would be difficult for a court to determine whether a plea is the result of prior 
                                                          
128 N. J. Ct. Rule 3:9-1(b) (2012) (“Any plea offer to be made by the prosecutor shall be in writing and forwarded to 
the defendant’s attorney.”).  
129 States with writing requirements include Alaska, AK R USDCT LCrR 11.2; Arizona, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.4(b); 
Indiana, Ind. Code Ann. § 35-35-3-3 (West); Kentucky,  KY R BOURBON SCOTT CIR CT Rule XXV; Nebraska, 
NE R 12 DIST Rule 12-4; New Jersey, N.J. Court Rules, R. 3:9-1; New Mexico, NM R MAG CT RCRP Rule 6-
502; North Carolina, NC R CUMBERLAND CTY SUPER CRIM; Pennsylvania, PA R CHESTER CTY RCRP 
Rule 590.4; Tennessee, TN R 20 DIST CRIM GEN SESS. 11.01; Texas, TX R BEXAR CRIM DIST CT Rule 5.28.  
130 See, e.g., the case notes following Ala. R. Crim. P. Rule 14.3 (describing how the court in Ex Parte Yarbar 
“noted that negotiated plea agreements are not unenforceable merely because they are unwritten,” but in subsequent 
cases, encouraged the use of written pleas. See Congo v. State, 455 So.2d 896 (Ala. 1984); Ex parte Swain, 527 
So.2d 1279 (Ala. 1988); Ex parte Cassady, 486 So.2d 453 (Ala. 1986). 
131 Cassady, 486 So.2d at 456.  
132 Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 135.390 (West)(2); See also N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-1022 (West) (“By inquiring of the 
prosecutor and defense counsel and the defendant personally, the judge must determine whether there were any prior 
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plea discussions if there is no record of those prior plea discussions.133 Interestingly, 
documentation of these plea discussions is required under Florida law when the defendant is pro 
se, requiring that the prosecuting attorney “maintain the record of direct discussions with a 
defendant who represents himself or herself and make the record available to the trial judge upon 
the entry of a plea arising from these discussions,” but not otherwise.134  
As attempts by various states to require oral discussions about plea offers between the 
defendant and the prosecution to be recorded in writing make clear, such formalization would 
help advance the goal of ensuring that plea offers have a factual basis, in addition to  ensuring 
that defendants are given a fair chance at proving an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. This 
is especially necessary given judicial disinclination to overturn a conviction, which is 
exacerbated by the fact that most defendants, in hindsight, would naturally claim they would 
have accepted the guilty plea.135 In dealing with cases in which an offer lapses or is rejected, 
there is often no record kept of the plea offer, thereby precluding the defendant from succeeding 
on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland.136 
C. Right of Courts to Reject a Plea  
 
The trial court’s authority to reject a plea offer once the defendant has already accepted it 
is derived from the persuasive influence of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.137 Although 
this rule affords trial courts broad liberty to reject a plea, “some reviewing courts require a trial 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
plea discussions, whether the parties have entered into any arrangement with respect to the plea and the terms 
thereof, and whether any improper pressure was exerted in violation of G.S. 15A-1021(b).”).  
133 Bibas, supra note 11, at 162 (“Plea decisions are especially likely to seem inevitable in hindsight because 
challenges depend on off-the-record evidence that is hard to prove.”).  
134 FL ST RCRP Rule 3.171. 
135 Bibas, supra note 11, at 162 (“judges are naturally skeptical and loath to overturn convictions and sentences, 
particularly final ones. That judicial inclination, whether conscious or unconscious, reinforces the difficulties of 
proving deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland.”).  
136 Id. (“Few defendants have documentary or other evidence that their attorneys did not tell them of a plea offer or 
gave them incorrect advice.”).  
137 FED R. CRIM. P. 11(C). 
24 
 
court to articulate on the record a sound reason for rejecting a plea.”138 Still, the standard for 
appellate review does not serve as much of a check on trial court discretion, as the appellate 
court can only reverse for an abuse of discretion.139 Until the trial court accepts the plea 
agreement, it is not binding upon the parties.140  
Every state has codified grounds under which the trial judge may reject a plea offer, with 
the exception of South Carolina, which relies upon case law to grant courts the authority to 
overrule plea agreements.141 These codifications require trial judges to ensure that the defendant 
enters a plea agreement voluntarily and knowingly, that there is a factual basis for the plea offer, 
and that due consideration is given to public interest and effective administration of justice.142 
The court may allow the defendant to withdraw a plea offer in order to correct a “manifest 
injustice” that would otherwise occur.143  
While these codifications are helpful, more standardization is required. First, clarification 
is needed as to whether these are the only grounds under which a trial court may reject a plea 
offer for the purposes of determining whether a defendant’s later claim of ineffective assistance 
                                                          
138 1A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 180 (4th ed. 2013). 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 See ALA. R. CRIM. P. 11; ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 17.2-, 17.3, 17.5; ARK. R. CRIM. P. 24.3-24.6, 26.1; CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 1016.5, 1192.5 (WEST); CO ST RCRP RULE 11; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-1J (WEST); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. 
P. 11; DE R COM PL CT RCRP RULE 11; FL ST RCRP RULE 3.170, 3.172; GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 33.7, 33.9, 
33.12; HAW. R. PENAL P. 11; HAW. REV. STAT. § 802E-2 (WEST)); I.C.R. 11 IDAHO CRIM. R. 11; IL R S CT RULE 
402; IND. CODE ANN. § 35-35-1-2 , § 35-35-1-3 (WEST); IA R 2.8; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3210; KY. R. CRIM. P. 8.08, 
8.10; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:145; LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 556, 559; ME. R. CRIM. P. 11; MD. R. 4-242; 
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 12; MA ST BOSTON MUN CT SPEC RCRP RULE 4; MA ST BOSTON MUN CT SPEC RCRP 
RULE 5; MI R RCRP MCR 6.302, 6.310; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.35 (WEST); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
32.1045 (WEST); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.01, 15.04-15.05; MISS. R. CRIM. P. 8.04; MO. SUP. CT. R. 24.02; MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 46-12-20, 46-12-212, 46-16-105; NE CRIMR 11.2; NV ST 2 DIST CT CRIM RULE 4; NH R DIST CT RULE 
2.4; N.J. COURT RULES, R. 3:9-2; NM R DIST CT RCRP RULE 5-304; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1022 (WEST); 
N.D. R. CRIM. P. 11; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2937.07 (WEST); OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 22, § 517 (WEST); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. TIT. 44, § 3270 (WEST); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135.335, 135.365, 135.385, 135.390, 135.395, 135.432 
(WEST); PA. R. CRIM. P 591; RI. R. CRIM. P. 11; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-7-3, 7-4, 7-5, 7-14, 27-11; TENN. R. 
CRIM. P. 11; TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. ART. 26.13 (WEST); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 11; VT. R. CRIM. P. 11; VA. SUP. 
CT. R. 7C:6; VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-296 (WEST); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.431 (WEST); W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 
11; W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 10. CT; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.08 (WEST). 
142 See supra note 107. 
143 See supra note 107. 
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of counsel should be entertained. Second, as noted earlier, requiring the prosecution and defense 
counsel to memorialize their negotiations would help the court determine if there was a factual 
basis for the plea. 
D. Right of Prosecutors to Withdraw a Plea Bargain Offer Prior to Entry of Plea in Court 
 
In Frye, the Supreme Court stated that under the second prong of Strickland, the 
defendant must show “that the plea would have been entered without the prosecution’s canceling 
it . . . if they had the authority to exercise that discretion under state law.”144 As Justice Scalia 
pointed out, no standard is articulated that describes the grounds under which the prosecution 
may exercise this discretion.145 In effect, the prosecution has unregulated discretion to reject a 
plea offer, even without a sound basis.146 The potential for abuse makes clear the need for 
codifying a standard that sets forth the precise grounds giving rise to the prosecutor’s authority to 
reject an accepted plea offer.   
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice states, “A prosecutor should not fail to comply 
with a plea agreement, unless a defendant fails to comply with a plea agreement or other 
extenuating circumstances are present.”147 This standard should be expanded to require the 
prosecution to explain under what circumstance the prosecution would have rejected the plea 
offer in the event that the defendant had accepted it. If there is a committee of prosecuting 
attorneys who discuss and render a decision as to whether or not to accept a defendant’s plea 
offer, then this discussion should be recorded in writing. The defendant can then ask for the 
record of plea discussions in discovery in the event that the prosecution claims it would not have 
accepted the plea offer even if the defendant accepted it.  
                                                          
144 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1403-04. 
145 See supra note 41 and surrounding text. 
146 See Bibas, supra note 11, at 162.  
147 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUSTICE SCJ 3-4.2 (3d ed., 1993). 
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Not only does the prosecution have wide discretion to reject a plea offer, but as discussed 
earlier, plea bargaining is characterized as a matter of “personal style” that allows the 
prosecution the liberty to negotiate in whatever manner it likes.148 Standards should therefore 
also be put in place to ensure against unfair bargaining, or in other words, to ensure that the 
prosecution is being fair and consistent to all defendants when offering pleas.149 At least one 
state, Oregon, has essentially codified a fair bargaining requirement: “Similarly situated 
defendants should be afforded equal plea agreement opportunities.”150 Here, as elsewhere, the 
movement by some states to codify requirements for the prosecution and the court in connection 
with plea bargaining indicates the need for such formalization, and provides an example for other 
states to follow.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Without formalization of the plea bargaining process from its initial stages of 
negotiations, Lafler and Frye will have provided a superficial right to defendants, without a 
corresponding ability to carry out this right. More formalization of the process may be an 
effective compromise between the extremes of a “laissez-faire bargaining system” on one end 
and overregulation of plea bargaining by courts on the other.151 If the plea bargaining process “is 
the criminal justice system,” as the Supreme Court recognizes, and such reality justifies the right 
of defendants to challenge a conviction on the basis of receiving ineffective assistance of counsel 
                                                          
148 See discussion supra note 103 and surrounding text.  
149 Cf. id., at 164 (arguing, “Prosecutors have strong self-interests and institutional interests in disposing of their 
cases quickly and consensually, so they can pursue other cases or lighten their own workloads.”).  
150 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135.405 (West). 
151 Bibas, supra note 11, at 152 (“In this laissez-faire bargaining system, defense lawyers, not judges or juries, are 
the primary guarantors of fair bargains and equal treatment for their clients.”). 
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during plea negotiations, then there should be requirements for the process to be recorded and for 
standards to ensure that the process is fair.152   
The requirements under Strickland articulate what defendants must prove to succeed with 
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining process.153 Under the first 
prong, the defendant must show defense counsel’s performance fell below the constitutional 
minimum for competency.154 To show incompetency, the defendant must be able to present 
evidence from the record; however, in the majority of states neither prosecuting attorneys nor 
defense counsel are obligated to create any record.155 Under the second prong of Strickland, the 
defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the defendant would have accepted the 
plea absent defense counsel’s ineffective assistance, that the prosecution would not have rejected 
the plea, and that the trial court would not have rejected the plea.156 This is where the need for 
formalization becomes most evident, as courts have stated that the defendant cannot rely on his 
or her self-serving testimony, but must demonstrate “objective evidence” to show that he or she 
would have accepted the plea absent defense counsel’s error.157 Even if the defendant can prove 
this, the defendant must still demonstrate that the prosecution and the court would not have 
rejected the plea offer.158 Both the prosecution and the court, however, are granted broad 
discretion; there is no defined standard that states the grounds under which they can reject a plea 
offer.159  
                                                          
152 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)). 
153 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1405. 
154 Id. at 1409. 
155 See supra note 128. 
156 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409. 
157 See supra notes 102 and 103.  
158 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409. 
159 See Bibas, supra note 11, at 162. 
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The specific recommendations for formalization in the plea bargaining system, as 
outlined above, are summarized as follows: first, plea negotiations should be required to be in 
writing; second, a standard must be codified, whereby prosecuting attorneys have a duty to 
engage in equal and fair bargaining; third, grounds under which prosecuting attorneys may reject 
a plea offer should be codified; fourth, oral discussions among prosecuting committees in 
deciding whether or not to accept a plea must be reduced to writing; fifth, clarification needs to 
be made as to whether the grounds under which a trial court may reject a plea offer, as codified 
in state statutes and rules, are the same grounds to be considered for the purposes of determining 
whether a defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be dismissed.  
The first recommendation – to put plea negotiations in writing – is the most important in 
light of the confusion that has emerged among lower courts over whether or not a defendant must 
be presented with a “formal offer” in order to bring a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
during plea bargaining.160 Courts have come to different conclusions on this issue after Lafler 
and Frye, with some defining a plea as “formal” even though it was not in writing.161 For the 
defendant who must rely on objective evidence independent of self-serving testimony, a writing 
requirement is a necessity. Furthermore, such a requirement would improve other areas of plea 
bargaining, such as helping the court determine whether there is a factual basis for a plea.162 
Much of the discussion on the effect of Lafler and Frye naturally focuses more on 
defense counsel, and the more stringent constitutional duty created by these cases.163 Such 
discussion centers on ensuring that defense counsel effectively represent their clients because of 
                                                          
160 See supra Part II.  
161 Wanatee, 101 F. Supp. 2d at 1202-03. 
162 See supra note 131 and surrounding text.  
163 See, e.g., Jane Campbell Moriarty & Marisa Main, “Waiving” Goodbye to Rights: Plea Bargaining and the 
Defense Dilemma of Competent Representations, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 1029, 1042 (2011) (discussing possible 
duties of defense counsel “to seek out plea negotiations with the prosecution”).  
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the fact that so much of plea bargaining occurs off the record.164 Less has been said, however, 
about how prosecuting attorneys are affected by the extension of the Sixth Amendment right to 
ineffective assistance of counsel to the plea bargaining process.165 Including prosecutors in the 
process is in many ways crucial to creating a just plea bargaining system.166 Without doing the 
work now to document plea negotiations, the burden on the prosecution at discovery to go 
through all of the records to see if there is anything on plea negotiations is potentially very 
burdensome. In the long run, more formalization of plea negotiations would ease the burden on 
the prosecution and defense counsel when litigation involving an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim is brought.167 Above all, in our criminal justice system, where a majority of cases 
are decided by plea bargains, the heaviest burden should not be on the defendant to ensure that 
the system is fair. 
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